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ABSTRACT 
Presently, most CubeSat components and buses are generally not appropriate for missions where significant or 
indeterminate risk of failure is unacceptable. This has precluded their use in many cases where their attributes could 
otherwise enable or enhance mission objectives. However, in the future, CubeSats and SmallSats, which deviate from 
CubeSat form factors but often incorporate CubeSat components and subsystems, will address challenges that many 
presently consider to be beyond the platform’s capabilities.  This growing potential utility, combined with the limited 
volume of successful CubeSat flight heritage,  is driving an interagency effort to improve small satellite mission 
confidence. 
The Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI)—an activity with broad participation from civil, DoD, and commercial 
space systems providers and stakeholders—has been targeting this challenge. This paper will update the community 
on how the public-private collaboration is being executed. It will discuss mission confidence approaches considered 
and defined to date, why and how they were derived, and next steps the team will implement to broaden SmallSat 
mission potential. 
https://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=20180005637 2019-08-31T15:11:26+00:00Z
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SSRI MOTIVATION 
Presently, CubeSat components and buses are generally 
not appropriate for missions where significant or 
indeterminate risk of failure is unacceptable. This has 
precluded their use where their attributes could 
otherwise enable or enhance mission objectives or 
provide other meaningful benefits (e.g., lower cost, 
increased spatial, temporal, and spectral coverage, 
agility, resiliency;, etc.).  Historically, this has not been 
an issue since it was understood and accepted that "high 
risk” and “CubeSat” were largely synonymous and 
expectations were set accordingly.  
The landscape is changing, however.  In a NASA 
context, numerous CubeSat and SmallSat missions—
small satellites that deviate from CubeSat form factors 
but often incorporate CubeSat components and 
subsystems—have been defined, are in development, or 
are deployed. These include scientific missions requiring 
1-3 years of reliable operation in Earth Orbit,  missions 
to Mars and Venus, asteroids and comets. There are also 
astrophysics concepts that seek exoplanets or missing 
matter by mapping the distribution of hot gases in the 
Milky Way, and CubeSat constellations that operate as a 
synthetic radio telescope probing solar energetic particle 
acceleration and release to address key Heliophysics 
questions.  Other governmental agencies have also 
formulated concepts that require mission success; 
interest in these platforms is not unique to NASA.   
These developments are evidence of the growing utility 
of these platforms and are driving a public-private effort 
to improve CubeSat and more generally, small satellite 
mission confidence, while preserving cost efficiencies of 
these platforms. 
INITIATIVE OBJECTIVES 
The Small Satellite Reliability Initiative (SSRI) has been 
targeting the SmallSat mission confidence challenge.  
SSRI with broad participation from civil, DoD, and 
commercial space systems providers and stakeholders 
has made significant progress towards defining and 
documenting a range of best practices and 
design/development guidelines—from those aligned 
with “do no harm” missions, to those whose failure 
would result in loss or delay of key national objectives.  
The effort approaches the challenge from multiple 
perspectives—from a high level that considers top-level 
mission architecture and objectives, to a lower level that 
considers component/ subsystem issues.  
SSRI considers several approaches to the challenge.  
These approaches and questions being addressed are as 
follows: 
• Best Practices and Design/Development 
Guidelines—What design/development guidance   
and best practices are consistent with confidence 
levels ranging from “do no harm” missions to those 
whose failure would result in loss or delay of key 
national objectives?  How should we “package” 
these guidelines so that they have the greatest utility 
and impact to the broad SmallSat community? 
• Lessons Learned—What should we learn from 
SmallSat missions that have flown and from 
missions in development to inform the success of 
future missions?   
• Knowledge Sharing— The pace of SmallSat 
mission capabilities advancement will be informed 
by how broadly the community shares knowledge. 
What information and resources should the 
SmallSat community exchange to increase mission 
success and reduce overall development costs?  
How do we grow and nurture a community that 
exhibits a willingness to share such knowledge more 
widely than historically demonstrated?  How do we 
disseminate it to where it is needed, when it is 
needed—to new entrants and established entrants 
alike?  What is the Government’s role in facilitating 
such sharing?   
• Model-based Approaches to Mission 
Confidence—How can we harness and apply the 
potential effectiveness and efficiencies associated 
with model-based approaches to small satellite 
mission confidence?  How do we inform the 
development of these tools such that their learning 
curve and user efficiency do not raise user entry and 
utilization barriers.  
SUMMARY OF PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
The paper Increasing Small Satellite Reliability- A 
Public-Private Initiative1 documented community 
recommendations from Technical Interchange Meeting-
1 (TIM-1) convened at the California Institute of 
Technology in February, 2017. The first recommendation 
was that a confidence-based approach is preferred over a 
Class A-D risk-based approach. Instead of characterizing 
risk, a SmallSat mission should instead perform some level 
of assurance activities to achieve a threshold of confidence 
acceptable for their mission.  
Secondly, attendees recommended a “menu-style” 
approach to inform the assurance activities appropriate  for 
a given CubeSat/SmallSat mission. This would facilitate a 
holistic approach to mission assurance where requirements 
are tailored based on trades at the mission or system level. 
With this model, a SmallSat mission may decide to 
perform high-confidence mission assurance activities in 
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certain areas and medium- or low-confidence activities in 
other areas, based on which components of the SmallSat 
are absolutely required to meet mission performance 
requirements in space.  Effectively, the mission would 
select its activities from a menu, and a determination of 
confidence-level would be made based on the activities 
performed and other contributing factors. 
These recommendations have led to a focus on several 
approaches to mission confidence— 
• Best Practices and Design/Development Guidelines 
• Lessons Learned 
• Knowledge Sharing 
• Model-Based Approaches 
A discussion of these approaches follows. 
2018 PROGRESS: INTERIM BEST PRACTICES 
AND DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT GUIDELINES 
There have been two SSRI Technical Interchange 
Meetings (TIMs) since the first one.  TIM-2 was held in 
October 2017 to discuss reliability topics (and in some 
cases the broader scope of mission assurance) as defined 
in a report titled “Mission Assurance Guidelines for A-
D Mission Risk Classes” under section A5-3 Matrix - 
Reliability.2  The agenda3 for this meeting can be found 
and a summary4 of the meeting are publicly available. 
As a result of these TIMs, a working group (WG) was 
formed.  This group comprises about 30 members from 
across industry, government, and academia. Using the 35 
reliability topics defined by the Aerospace Corporation’s 
Technical Operating Report (TOR), the WG researched 
each topic and documented best practices, references, 
and key questions that would help someone identify how 
and when a topic should be used in the development and 
operations of small satellites.  
This WG also focused on defining a method for 
distributing the information to the small satellite 
community. The current archiecture focuses on a web-
based data set that uses a searchable database of the 
information and resources collected so that users can 
have more of a “one-stop-shop” for what Reliability 
means and how to apply it to small satellites. Further the 
web-based architecture will have more of a guided, 
interactive tool that could be used to help users through 
which reliability topics are the greatest return on time 
and cost investment to improve mission assurance. This 
tool asks a basic set of questions regarding the mission 
of interest and then offers guidance on which specific 
practices that inform mission confidence should be used, 
or not used. While still a work in progress, key questions 
are: 
• What is the mission architecture and how does this 
inform practices for missions such as: 
– A large Low Earth Orbit (LEO)/Medium Earth 
Orbit (MEO) Constellation 
– A Geostationary Earth Orbit (GEO) satellite 
with lifetime of ≤ 5 years in orbit 
– A mission beyond GEO 
– A LEO mission with 1-2 satellites and lifetime 
< 1 year 
– A LEO mission with 1-2 satellites and lifetime 
> 1 year 
• What are the key practices that reduce mission risk 
and increase mission assurance? 
• Are there any specific mission or hardware drivers 
that weight some practices higher/lower impact? 
– What are the key technical challenges and 
risks? 
– Should higher risk elements receive more 
focus? 
– How much program risk is acceptable? 
This work will help organize and better define “heritage” 
processes and practices (i.e. the 35 reliability topics). 
The group also collected best practices from the 35 
topics plus a small subset of past, present, and future 
missions. These both inform, and help expand, the scope 
of the best practices to be done.  
Summary of Top Confidence Building Activities 
During the most recent Technical Interchange Meeting 
(TIM-3) following the CubeSat Developers Workshop in 
May 2018, the attendees voted on the top activities (from 
the 35 topics) that yield greatest increase in confidence. 
This was based upon experience/opinion of a variety of 
people from industry (7), academia (9), and government 
(11). These top activities include engineering the system 
for higher confidence, design review and analysis, 
radiation testing, and software reliability. The key 
practices are further detailed in the next subsections 
since they were identified by the larger team as key best 
practices.  Note that findings are interim; the best 
practice effort is ongoing. 
Engineering the System for Higher Confidence was 
voted by the TIM-3 attendees as the topic area they found 
most useful for increasing SmallSat reliability. The 
topic, as explored by the WG, focused on identifying 
perspectives that should be considered within the 
SmallSat systems engineering process that can enhance 
mission and system resiliency and ensure the entire 
system is appropriately defined for the mission. Cost, 
schedule, and risk posture of the mission are a few of the 
factors identified that can significantly impact the 
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systems engineering methods and processes that a 
SmallSat employs. Trades must be performed by each 
mission to determine the most feasible approach. Some 
of the Systems Development Life Cycle (SDLC) models 
and methods identified by the SSRI WG are listed below. 
• Waterfall Model5 
• V Model6 
• Evolutionary Prototyping Model7 
• Spiral Method (SDM)8 
• Interative and Incremental Method9 
• Agile Development10 
 
Many of the models and methodologies listed above 
have been proven on traditional mission architectures 
and software engineering. They can be broad and 
conservative in nature. They were designed to cover a 
wide range of mission applications. For SmallSats it is 
extremely important to understand what mission specific 
systems engineering activities and methodologies add 
the most value given resource constraints. One idea that 
has the potential to achieve this is Model Based Systems 
Engineering (MBSE) and Model Based Mission 
Assurance (MBMA)11. Effective MBSE and MBMA 
requires intimate knowledge and understanding of a 
particular mission architecture and application. If 
modeled with high fidelity MBSE and MBMA can 
provide a SmallSat project with a value added 
understanding of what systems engineering activities 
should be pursued. The challenge associated with MBSE 
and MBMA, at the moment, is the tradeoff in overhead 
to perform and maintain the modeling versus performing 
the traditional systems engineering activities. This is 
something that is being explored and must be addressed 
in order for MBSE and MBMA to be useful to this class 
of missions. 
Small satellite missions often have unique cost- or 
capability-driven constraints.  These constraints should 
inform a mission architecture that mitigate their impacts.  
Consider for example, the ground segment and 
command/data bandwidth. Cost and capability may 
constrain operators’ ability to monitor and control in-
space assets.  Such an impact can be mitigated by 
migrating targeted functions that are typically executed 
on the ground—such as fault detection and recovery—to 
space.  Such approaches to “engineering the system” for 
resiliency, are critical to the achieving target levels of 
mission confidence.  The WG expects many novel 
approaches are yet to be conceived. 
 
Design review and analysis is another topic that the 
TIM-3 attendees found to be useful. Interim guidelines 
summarize standard design reviews, illustrate which 
reviews are often employed at the mission and subsystem 
level of a program, and describe best practices for 
effective reviews. Similar to the systems engineering 
section, the SSRI WG found that SmallSat design 
reviews may be combined or eliminated depending on 
the project budget, schedule, and risk posture. For 
example, very small spacecraft (e.g. CubeSats) might not 
need a set of separate, formal Subsystem-level reviews.  
Especially when a subsystem (e.g. power or the attitude 
determination and control system (ADCS)) is being 
procured as a commodity item and has already been 
delivered and/or flown for other customers. The NASA 
Systems Engineering Handbook (NASA SP-2016-6105) 
was used as a reference to define the different reviews a 
SmallSat mission may consider and when they are 
applicable. NASA Systems Engineering Processes and 
Requirements (NPR-7123-001B) was also referenced to 
show when reviews are typically held throughout the 
project life cycle and the product maturity goals for the 
different reviews. 
Radiation testing was tied for second place with design 
review and analysis for topics that the TIM-3 attendees 
found most useful. Radiation testing was likely ranked 
high by attendees due to the number of electronic 
subsystem designers present. An overview of radiation 
sources present in the space environment (e.g. solar 
particles), types of radiation effects (e.g. single event 
effects (SEE)), and radiation tests with best practices 
were provided in this section. In summary, it’s important 
for SmallSats to understand the susceptibilities of the 
EEE parts they have selected, whether though test, 
analysis, or historical knowledge of the part or its 
fabrication and design process.   
The WG has spent significant time investigating these 
topics and has queried numerous sources to derive 
interim findings in each area. However, the WG has 
recognized that significant work remains to organize the 
information that has been collected and tailor best 
practices to small satellites.  
Software Reliability.  In-space software will greatly 
inform mission confidence—either through practices 
that yield reliable software, or through practices that can 
mitigate the impact of system failures and anomalies.  
The following recommendations largely address the 
former. 
The WG identified and addressed many elements that 
improve software reliability both from best practices and 
established processes. Several specific definitions are 
used relative to software. “Reliable software” is robust 
and fault tolerant, has very few, if any, bugs and has a 
long mean time between errors. When an error occurs, it 
is able to handle off-nominal conditions, invalid inputs, 
unforeseen events, and varied operational scenarios, 
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handling the error and recovering gracefully. Reliable 
software is a subset of quality software. “Quality 
software” typically considers functionality, usability, 
efficiency, maintainability, portability, scalability, and 
reliability.  
The following discussion summarizes best practices on 
how to achieve reliable software, organized into three 
major elements:  
• Management (organization/staff, managing 
Information Technology (IT)) 
• Process (development methodology, testing) 
• Implementation and Coding Techniques (watch 
dog timer use, exception handling) 
Management- Software Reliability  
Mentoring: Pair senior experienced programmers to 
mentor to junior programmers 
Embed software engineers with stakeholders: Embed 
software engineers with hardware engineers and 
scientists for new research and development. Currently, 
many organizations do not do this. For example,  NASA 
uses software development groups that are often 
physically separated from the hardware and instrument 
developers. One of the advantages of many small 
satellite teams is there is a potential for greater hands-on 
feedback between all parties.  
Process- Software Reliability 
The software development process has to match the 
underlying project and be cognizant of the stakeholder’s 
expectations. It should address issues such as how is the 
software going to work with the hardware? What is the 
operational scenario? What data are expected to be 
produced? Early in a project, structural patterns are more 
useful than requirements in developing the basic 
architecture for a software system. One key practice is to 
conceptualize the software and see how it interacts with 
all other elements of the mission. There should be an 
understanding of the concept of operations, 
characteristics of components, the scheme of the 
software, the use cases, operational scenarios, and the 
hardware interfaces. Development of a hardware-
software interface control document (ICD) can be useful 
for early software design. This is a more useful mental 
model for early software development than merely 
listing the requirements. 
Understand what are hard versus soft requirements: 
Programmers need to have a sense of the types of things 
that can change during development and what is 
inflexible. Key contributions to requirement definition 
include: 
 
 
• Conducting trade studies as necessary 
• Including hardware testability into software 
requirements 
• Partitioning ground software functions and 
flight software functions early 
• Planning for software development 
targets/platforms that precede flight hardware 
• Planning how to upgrade/patch flight software 
• Making fault tolerance and error handling part 
of the software architecture from the beginning 
Plan a robust testing program: Set up a testing schedule 
and understand what configuration of component units 
are needed to perform the tests planned. Coordinate with 
management to plan appropriate units of hardware 
builds. Test as early as possible. Perform software 
assisted component end-to-end testing as soon as 
available and aim for end-to-end flat-sat tests as soon as 
possible. Plan to use simulators and dummy loads for 
testing to increase fidelity of tests. Institute an 
independent testing program; the software programmer 
should be different than the tester.  
Implementation- Software Reliability 
Design the system architecture for test and operation: 
Start early conversations between hardware and software 
engineers. Both sides must understand the 
hardware/software interfaces and requirements. 
Software requirements drive hardware design and vice 
versa. Design the system such that if failure or fault 
occurs, the root cause can be derived from the telemetry 
and science data. The system should be configurable 
such that telemetry can be commanded to vary collection 
of type and frequency of telemetry data if necessary.  
Use of timeouts: Liberal use of watch dog time outs will 
prevent software from hanging and provide a “safety 
valve” for the software to trap and handle errors. 
Exception handling: Think through faults and 
contingency cases. Have event handlers that detect errors 
within software. Create syntax checking code. Have a 
process in software that consistently detects, handles, 
and responds to anomalous conditions in a safe manner 
Use of good programming practices: Minimize scope of 
variables, have simple testable modules and minimize 
parameters allowed for unit testing, design and write 
code to minimize paths such that full path test is that is 
not onerous, practice modularity with small subroutines; 
break the work down so that they are easily testable, 
trackable, understandable, strictly use revision control 
system, and strictly employ a bug tracking system. 
Johnson 6 32nd Annual AIAA/USU 
  Conference on Small Satellites 
Software repository: Build a repository of tested code 
based on standard hardware for reuse.  Given hardware 
always changes, build a layer of software that is designed 
to be configurable for new hardware e.g., NASA cFE’s 
“OS Abstraction Layer” 
Testing: Bake-in the testing into the code; in other words, 
when developing new modules, think and write the test 
code. Coordinate the test suite – have a program that can 
test the software as you run. Automate suite testing and 
unit testing to the extent practical. “Unit testing” is 
testing individual modules separate from each other. It 
requires designing well written modules with carefully 
designed and controlled interfaces for minimal external 
effect. Poor code might have large unwieldy modules 
that cannot easily be tested independently.  
There are many facets to software reliability and 
programs can utilize some or all of the above practices. 
Many of the implementation practices and testing 
practices should be prioritized as they are, often, highest 
return-on-investment. 
LESSONS LEARNED 
Small satellite missions rarely fit into traditional 
reliability classifications; therefore, design and 
reliability practices vary more than those of traditional 
space programs. SSRI technical interchange meetings 
have included lessons learned presentations by leaders of 
SmallSat missions that have addressed a diverse set of 
missions, including a 3U CubeSat RF technology 
demonstrator, an ESPA class imaging satellite, a 
MicroSat LEO Earth science constellation, and Lunar 6U 
CubeSat. Lessons learned from these missions provide 
important guidance for future SmallSat teams. Many of 
the findings from SSRI’s 2018 meetings were originally 
identified in SSRI TIM-1 in February 2017, which are 
summarized in the bulleted list in the “TIM Findings” 
section of Johnson et al., 201712.  In this section, 
additional lessons learned from the more recent TIMs are 
described. 
Subsystem procurement and EEE part selection. For 
SmallSat missions, following existing standards is not 
typically practical in selection of EEE parts or 
subsystems. As a result, a common thread in the lessons 
learned shared through the SSRI has been subsystem 
procurement and EEE part selection. At the EEE part 
level, use of commercial and automotive grade 
components is key to keeping costs low. However, each 
part should have a reliability “story” that addresses the 
risks associated with flying parts that are not space 
qualified and screened. This story should provide 
answers for thermal, structural, and radiation 
performance in the expected environment(s) via testing, 
flight heritage, or analysis. In many cases, this story will 
not satisfy stated mission goals or will simply 
acknowledge that the reliability is unknown – this is still 
extremely valuable.  Identifying and documenting these 
risks allows for feedback into the design process. When 
using EEE part test data, it is essential to consider the 
risk of design changes and lot-to-lot variations in 
commercial/automotive grade parts that are not 
manufacturer qualified to the target environment(s) (e.g. 
radiation, thermal). This risk can perhaps be mitigated 
via derating relative to the test results.  
Parts Reliability.  The level of subsystem design and 
manufacturing variability currently in the SmallSat 
market provides additional challenges to parts selection 
process.  To mitigate the reliability uncertainty caused 
by the lack of strict design, manufacturing, test, and 
analysis requirements  it is essential for SmallSat design 
teams to communicate with vendors. Such engagement 
will help the development team identify the highest risk 
sub-systems or weakest link in the typically single string 
system. This triage of risk allows the team to focus  
additional effort to minimize performance-loss, 
efficiency-loss, and any budget on the areas most likely 
to fail 
Fault Recovery and On-Orbit Reconfigurability.  Design 
and planning for fault recovery and on-orbit 
reconfigurability was found by several SmallSat 
missions to be essential for mission success. Downlink 
of housekeeping/state-of-health telemetry and having a 
representative flatsat is key to on-orbit failure recovery, 
resolution, and mitigation.  An ability to accommodate 
software updates should inform the designs of the 
spacecraft communications subsystem and ground 
stations; uplink capability has been a challenge for many 
missions. 
Management. Establishing a SmallSat team and 
managing the design process was found to be an 
important element of an efficient yet reliable mission. 
SmallSat mission leaders found that small but 
experienced teams with reduced administrative burdens 
were ideal. The best practices and judgement of an 
experienced team can be used to reduce risk when the 
level of analysis, test, and review associated with 
traditional programs is not possible or practical with 
SmallSat budget and schedule constraints.  
Design guidelines and best practices applied by 
SmallSat teams. The unique constraints of SmallSat 
design leads to unique hardware design challenges, 
solutions, and failures. This leads us to another common 
thread in lessons learned shared through the SSRI: 
specific design guidelines and best practices applied by 
SmallSat design teams. In this respect, the output is the 
following list of somewhat disparate guidelines/best 
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practices that were either found valuable to success by a 
particular mission, or that would have prevented an on-
orbit anomaly or failure: 
• Increase amount of telemetry collected on-board 
and avoid use of inferred information.  The 
expanding use of satellite-to-satellite relay greatly 
increases the bandwidth possible. 
• Avoid scaling “big space” reliability practices to 
small satellites but instead scale small satellites to 
higher levels of detail to address critical elements 
and tall poles. 
• Vehicles need to have the ability to hard reset the 
computer and other elements to properly clear 
Single Event Effects (SEEs). 
– Ensure this capability is independent of the 
flight computer 
• Vehicles need to have ability to reprogram/update 
software. 
– Do not discount the need for uplink bandwidth. 
Data volumes can be large when updating flight 
software anomalies. 
KNOWLEDGE SHARING 
Improved avenues for knowledge sharing have the 
potential to benefit all members of the SmallSat 
community: government, industry, and academia. 
Knowledge sharing avenues addressed to date by the 
SSRI cover three distinct areas: parts, subsystems, and 
missions.  
Parts 
Sharing part-level test data has been traditionally 
facilitated by government organizations and part 
manufacturers. These reports allow for subsystem 
developers to minimize risk while designing with 
commercial parts when possible and practical given a 
radiation environment and risk posture. These EEE part 
radiation reports are most readily available on NASA 
(JPL and GSFC) and ESA online databases, with 
additional test data available through various journals, 
conference proceedings (e.g. NSREC), and other places. 
Unfortunately, the data are spread in multiple locations 
and in different formats.  Furthermore these databases 
are often years out of date with respect to the test data 
that have been collected and analyzed. The NASA Small 
Spacecraft System Virtual Institute is currently 
developing a federated radiation database portal to allow 
access to all of the key databases from one site and 
search/browse page.  
When companies invest in part-levels radiation testing, 
the cost and competitive advantage provided by the 
testing and analysis usually precludes them from sharing 
with the community. SSRI discussions led to a few 
knowledge sharing concepts that can broadly benefit 
companies. One concept involves the formation of a 
consortium where all entities would, under a mutual non-
disclosure agreement (MNDA), pool their EEE part 
radiation test data. However, it would be very 
challenging to ensure that all members contribute their 
part to the pool of data. A simpler concept involves an 
online board where entities register and share what data 
they have or what they are looking for (with whatever 
level of detail they are comfortable sharing). This would 
allow users to search the postings that align with their 
needs and follow up outside of the system to arrange 
trades or purchases of test data. 
Subsystems 
Subsystem level data sharing is currently underway 
through the Space Parts on Orbit Now (SPOON) 
database developed by the Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL); however, access is still limited.  
There are efforts underway to make it accessible to a 
wider community (see Johnson et al., 201713 for more 
details). SPOON currently hosts datasheets and 
specifications for SmallSat subsystems. In the future, 
subsystem integrators will be able to to report and share 
failures or more minor issues in the database. This 
feedback will help vendors improve their designs and  
assist others with product selection and integration.  
Missions 
Statistics on mission success/failure and other details 
that have been shown to contribute to mission success 
have been analyzed. This work (e.g. Swartwout and 
Jayne, 2016)14 is a useful way to identify risk areas, so 
that they can be corrected. As the importance and 
prevalence of SmallSat grows, these statistics are needed 
to inform new reliability processes and standards 
targeted at these missions. Improved knowledge sharing 
could be accomplished through an online survey, maybe 
anonymous to improve response rate. 
MODEL BASED APPROACHES 
Many of the electronic components developed for 
traditional large spacecraft do not meet the size and 
power requirements of SmallSats. By necessity, 
developers are almost exclusively using electronics 
produced for the consumer market that are not designed 
to meet a harsh radiation environment or operate in the 
temperature range of space. Consequently, no radiation 
test data exists for these components nor does the 
manufacturer guarantee the reliability of parts operated 
outside of the normal operating temperature range. This 
lack of information is of concern for low earth missions 
despite the fact that the most harmful and penetrating 
radiation events are shielded by the earth’s magnetic 
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field. However, the environmental hazards are greatly 
increased in deep space where maintaining normal 
thermal ranges is more difficult and the ionizing 
radiation fluxes are higher and more damaging. 
The SSRI is evaluating alternatives to the traditional 
approach to screen and test commercial electronics for 
two reasons. First and foremost, cost and schedule are 
typically too constrained to permit a complete radiation 
and reliability test program for all electronic parts used 
on a SmallSat. Such test programs can cost millions and 
easily add years to the schedule. Secondly, the infor-
mation needed during the design cycle changes.  
Moreover, the designer has to have some reasonable 
confidence the components can survive the mission 
environment prior to completing the design or risk many 
redesign cycles as parts fail the environmental tests. This 
conundrum can be solved through a comprehensive 
modeling approach that provides some rudimentary 
insight into the failure modes and component reliability 
at the onset of a design and matures to predictive part and 
circuit modeling later in the design cycle. 
Inductive Models 
The SSRI has identified a number of reliability modeling 
tools capable of modeling a complex system such a 
whole spacecraft. The benefit of this class of tools is that 
the designer can understand risk drivers at the SmallSat 
level even when the design is at the block diagram level 
or evaluate the efficacy of design choices such as 
redundancy. To achieve this level of insight, one might 
be already well served by using generic reliability 
information from, for example, multi-junction solar 
panels flown in the past. While this approach may not 
capture the true performance of the actual panels, it will 
be sufficient to evaluate the spacecraft’s power 
distribution system over its lifetime. 
The typical structure of such tools is comprised of a 
functional layer that describes the logical operation of 
the system and a physical layer that traces faults through 
a fault tree. In many instances, a statistical layer can be 
added, where system level failure probabilities and their 
uncertainties can be computed through a Monte Carlo 
simulation or through Bayesian Belief Networks. The 
SSRI is currently evaluating a tool by UCLA15 to model 
a notional 6U deep space SmallSat for reliability and 
radiation effects and build reusable libraries of 
subsystems that can be adapted by actual SmallSat 
missions. 
The goal is to construct these model libraries to leverage 
information provided by lower level predictive models 
(see also next section), or by manufacturers of 
commercial electronics. Such information sources 
include data and specification sheets, part macro-
models, and process design kits; all of which are readily 
accessible.  
Predictive Models 
The second branch of the model-based approach is 
intended to be predictive.  
Of all the environmental effects on microelectronics in 
space, radiation effects dominate the failure rates. It is 
safe to say that all digital and mixed signal electronics 
will experience some level of radiation induced errors 
and all power electronics will experience a total dose 
induced performance degradation. The point is that the 
vast majority of commercial electronics will see either a 
performance degradation or a non-recoverable failure in 
the deep space radiation environment.  
Still, the space industry has learned to mitigate these 
radiation effects to a degree at the circuit level (i.e. 
watchdog timers), the board level (i.e. redundancy) or 
the system level (i.e. power down during the transit 
through the South Atlantic Anomaly) as long as the 
severity and frequency these radiation effects are limited. 
Therefore, it is imperative to accurately model the 
radiation effects at the part level, and simulate the impact 
on the circuit/board as well as the effectiveness of 
potential mitigation schemes relatively early in the 
design cycle. One of the challenges is that this requires 
modeling and simulation approaches that can propagate 
radiation effects across multiple levels of abstraction 
from the transistor to the system level.  
The SSRI is evaluating a number of radiation-aware 
modeling tools for the ability to predict radiation effects 
in various commercial electronic components. The 
IMPACT tool16 is an Arizona State University tool to 
model the total dose effects on bipolar junction transistor 
(BJT) structures as a function of accumulated dose and 
dose rate. Initial comparisons with experimental data 
have demonstrated a good agreement between the code 
and bipolar components such as regulators, voltage 
regulators and temperature sensors from various 
manufacturers.  
The next step up in the simulation hierarchy is the 
Vanderbilt University effort to use the commercial 
Questa tool by Mentor Graphics17 to simulate the impact 
of transistor-level parameter changes arising from total 
dose irradiation on the system-level behavior of a 
command and data-handling (C&DH) board for a 
notional deep space CubeSat. The C&DH board has 
various analog, digital, mixed-signal, and thermal 
components that require a diverse set of simulation 
approaches. Mentor Questa is demonstrated to be a co-
simulation platform that can accept models written in 
SPICE, VHDL, Verilog, and SystemC and simulate 
them all together with coordinated time stepping. The 
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team constructed radiation models of various 
components on the C&DH board with parameters that 
had probability distributions derived from continuous 
Bayesian regression, Compact model results from the 
IMPACT tool and radiation test data. Subsequently, a 
Monte Carlo simulation randomly sampled the 
parameter distributions in both the radiation and the 
electrical models. The overall technique was 
demonstrated on a temperature control loop for the 
C&DH board. The simulation method predicts an 
increase of 10 to 15 Kelvin in steady-state temperature, 
depending on the radiation dose. The same modeling 
method can be used to predict the impact of radiation on 
other board-level performance metrics. 
THE FUTURE 
SSRI is a dynamic initiative, with a goal of improving 
SmallSat mission confidence in order to facilitate 
broader use of these platforms for missions where their 
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